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R E V I E W E S S A Y B Y G L E N G E N D Z E L * 
Imagine the University of California, the nation’s top public university system, mired in crisis. Its renowned faculty are demoralized and de-
pleted by waves of layoffs, resignations, and forced retirements. Promising 
young scholars turn down UC job offers; established academic superstars 
depart for more hospitable employment elsewhere. So many classes are 
cancelled that already crowded classrooms get jammed beyond capacity 
and UC students are unable to finish their degrees on time. Politicians 
in Sacramento gleefully pander to the public by attacking UC professors 
as elitist, out of touch, and morally suspect. The university’s prestige suf-
fers, the value of a UC degree declines, and a miasma of mistrust poisons 
campus life. Things get so bad that the UC Academic Senate officially de-
clares the university “a place unfit for scholars to inhabit” because it has 
embarked on “a tragic course toward bankruptcy” (p. 202). 
Imagine this crisis happening to the University of California — not 
today, but in 1950. The crisis came not from budget cuts but from a self-
inflicted wound: the so-called “loyalty oath.” Starting in 1949, the UC 
Board of Regents, on its own initiative, required all UC employees to sign 
* Professor, Department of History, San José State University. 
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an oath declaring that they did not belong to the Communist Party. No 
UC professors were even accused of being communists, but the penalty 
for not signing the Regents’ oath was automatic dismissal from the uni-
versity regardless of rank, tenure, or job performance. Actual membership 
(or non-membership) in the Communist Party had no bearing onwhether 
faculty could keep their jobs; what mattered was whether they signed the 
oath. UC professors objected to the loyalty oath because it was coercive, it 
violated academic freedom, it imposed a political test for employment, and 
perhaps worst of all, it abrogated tenure. Most faculty members eventu-
ally signed under extreme duress, but a substantial minority chose to fight 
the oath. The result was nearly two years of agitation, recrimination, con-
troversy, moral anguish, bureaucratic wrangling, political grandstanding, 
financial hardship, interrupted careers, several heart attacks, and the fir-
ing of over thirty eminent scholars and teachers. Ultimately the issue was 
resolved by the intervention of the governor, an act of the state Legislature, 
and a ruling of the state Supreme Court— all of which left no one satisfied 
but everyone relieved that at least the ordeal was over. 
There was nothing new about a mandatory oath of loyalty for UC 
faculty. Since 1942, all California state employees had been required to 
swear allegiance to the state and federal constitutions. But in 1949, as the 
ColdWar intensified, as Communism spread across Europe and Asia, and 
as revelations of Soviet espionage in the United States began to emerge, 
UC employees were singled out for a special anti-communist oath. Strong 
opposition arose immediately, though the ranks of non-signing profes-
sors dwindled as it became clear that they really would lose their jobs. 
Non-signers insisted that Communist Party membership alone should 
not disqualify anyone from university employment. Only demonstrably 
disloyal professors who advocated violent overthrow of the United States 
government in their teaching or their scholarship should be subject to dis-
missal — and even then, they should only be disciplined by the faculty 
itself through its own self-governing committees after a proper evidentiary 
hearing, not by the administration. To dismiss a professor merely for pre-
sumed membership in the Communist Party, rather than for any actual 
act of disloyalty, constituted guilt by association and denial of due pro-
cess. Even worse, the non-signers protested, it violated academic freedom 
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and foreshadowed a totalitarian-style purge of intellectuals such as had 
occurred in Soviet Russia, fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany in the 1930s. At 
UC, the non-signers included no actual communists but many European 
refugees from fascism who were already familiar with ideological purges 
and who sensed one in the making. 
During the controversy, the faculty offered an olive branch to the Re-
gents: they voted overwhelmingly in favor of the principle of excluding 
communists from the university, even as they voted just as overwhelming-
ly against firing faculty who refused to sign the oath. Later the faculty ac-
cepted an olive branch that they thought the Regents had offered to them: 
non-signers got a hearing before duly constituted faculty tenure commit-
tees to determine their loyalty. Neither compromise worked, however.The 
Regents enforced the oath over faculty objections, and they summarily 
fired non-signers with no regard for the findings of faculty committees. 
Such strong-arm tactics forced the vast majority of UC professors to sign 
the oath, but they were deeply embittered by the unpleasant experience of 
being “brow-beaten into submission,” as one of them said (p. 171). Gov-
ernor Earl Warren, a UC alumnus, opposed the oath; he pointed out that 
unquestionably loyal faculty members would lose their jobs “not because 
they are communists, or suspected of being communists, but because they 
are recalcitrant” (p. 182). Luckily for Governor Warren, and for the non-
signing faculty, enough seats on the Board of Regents came open during 
the protracted controversy thatWarrenwas able to appoint several new re-
gents who shared his point of view.The votes of these replacement regents 
tipped the balance, just barely, toward rescission of the oath. 
At the same time, however, Governor Warren knew that he faced a 
potentially difficult reelection campaign in 1950, and he could not af-
ford to appear “soft on Communism” over this issue. So even as he or-
chestrated the repeal of the Regents’ loyalty oath, Warren convinced the 
Legislature to approve an even tougher oath for all state employees. In 
this way, Warren was able to prove his anti-communist credentials and 
secure his reelection, while at the same time reassuring UC faculty that 
at least they were no longer being singled out. In 1952, professors who 
had been fired for refusing to sign the Regents’ oath were reinstated by a 
ruling of the state Supreme Court, Tolman v. Underhill (39 Cal.2d 708). 
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Oral arguments drew record crowds to the Court’s chambers in San 
Francisco, but much to the disappointment of both sides, the ruling was 
on narrowly technical grounds: the Legislature’s mandated oath for all 
state employees superceded the Regents’ special oath for UC employees. 
The Court did not question the propriety of a political oath for teach-
ers and scholars, nor did it uphold academic freedom or the sanctity of 
tenure, even though these issues were raised by the plaintiffs. The fired 
professors got their jobs back, and they even received back pay, but it was 
a somewhat pyrrhic payoff because the faculty as a whole lost some pre-
cious prerogatives in the process. 
These insights into the loyalty oath controversy are gleaned from 
Bob Blauner’s fascinating new history, entitled, Resisting McCarthyism: 
To Sign or Not to Sign California’s Loyalty Oath (2009). An emeritus pro-
fessor of sociology, Blauner was a graduate student at UC Berkeley in the 
1950s before he began teaching there in 1963. Over the years, Blauner 
must have heard so many versions of this story from senior colleagues 
that he apparently felt compelled to seek out the facts for himself. The 
result is a meticulously detailed account based on formidable research. 
Previously, the definitive work on this subject was David Gardner’s The 
California Oath Controversy (1967), which benefited from Gardner’s ex-
clusive access to confidential records of the Board of Regents. Blauner 
seems not to have been granted similar access, but Gardner deposited 
his own voluminous research materials at the Bancroft Library in 2004, 
including copies of many Regents’ records that Blauner was able to use. 
In addition, the most important new sources that Blauner brings to bear 
are oral histories dictated by dozens of UC professors and administra-
tors. Most of these personal reminiscences were collected, edited, and 
preserved by UC’s Regional Oral History Office in the years since Gard-
ner’s book was published. Blauner also tracked down some of the last few 
surviving oath resisters, their spouses, and their descendants in order 
to conduct interviews of his own, which incidentally gained him access 
to unpublished sources in family custody as well. Best of all, Blauner 
has read deeply in campus newspapers and the local press from this pe-
riod, opening a rich trove of source material that Gardner omitted from 
his rather dry, bureaucratic, internal account of UC’s administrative 
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machinations. Gardner was already a UC administrator when he wrote 
his book, and eventually he rose to become UC president, serving from 
1983 to 1992; Blauner, by contrast, writes from a professor’s point of view. 
That viewpoint gives Blauner a distinct advantage in telling this story. 
As a longtime faculty member familiar with universities in general and 
with the UC system in particular, Blauner is able to explore dimensions 
of the controversy overlooked by less seasoned observers. Standard ac-
counts such as David Caute’s The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge 
under Truman and Eisenhower (1978), Ellen Schrecker’s No Ivory Tower: 
McCarthyism and the Universities (1986), Richard Fried’s Nightmare in 
Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective (1990), and Kurt Schuparra’s Tri-
umph of the Right: The Rise of the California Conservative Movement, 
1945–1966 (1998) place California’s loyalty oath controversy in the con-
text of the larger “Red Scare” that swept the nation in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. It is tempting to compare UC’s Regents, ever-vigilant in their 
quest to root out communists from the faculty, with national red-baiting 
politicians such as Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, or California’s own 
Richard Nixon and Jack Tenney. The usual assumption is that similarly 
base political motives were at work in California as in Washington, D.C. 
Blauner’s approach, however, is different: he does entwine his narrative 
with Cold War events in order to remind readers of the prevailing anti-
communist mood, but he does not try to portray the oath controversy 
strictly as a battle by brave civil libertarians against political repression. 
He senses that there was more to the story. 
Blauner perceives that beneath the surface, the loyalty oath con-
troversy was “a power struggle over the governance of the university” 
(p. 100). The trouble started not because of any genuine concern over 
faculty loyalty; rather, the real issues were UC’s prestige and autonomy. 
After embarrassing stories about left-wing speakers at UC campuses ap-
peared in the press, state legislators threatened to investigate commu-
nist infiltration of the UC faculty. This threat of outside interference is 
what goaded the Regents into hastily adopting a loyalty oath in order to 
protect UC’s image and to preserve their own independence from state 
control. The controversy then escalated when significant numbers of UC 
faculty members, much to the Regents’ surprise, refused to sign the oath. 
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Blauner shows again and again that as the confrontation unfolded, the 
only faculty “loyalty” that the Regents seriously expected or cared about 
was loyalty to their own authority, and the only proof of such loyalty that 
they would accept was a professor’s willingness to obey their orders. A 
professor’s refusal to sign the oath may well have signaled disloyalty, but 
not disloyalty to the nation; it signaled disloyalty to the Regents, at least 
by their own self-important reckoning, and such a blatant act of defiance 
they could never accept. 
Gardner’s account, written early in his career as a UC administrator, 
also alluded to the academic power struggle behind the loyalty oath con-
troversy. But it takes a battle-scarred veteran of campus politics such as 
Blauner, who spent over forty years at UC Berkeley, to convey all the nu-
ances, absurdities, and ironies of professors and administrators locked in 
bureaucratic combat. Both sides seemed to agree that Communism was 
not the issue; rather, the issue became who would have the power to de-
cide what UC faculty members must do and who would have the power 
to dismiss them for not doing it. The Regents, like most administrators, 
absolutely refused to cede authority over personnel decisions; UC faculty, 
like most professors, clung fiercely to tenure protection and to their right 
to choose their own colleagues according to academicmerit as determined 
by the faculty themselves. One side might claim that they were trying to 
root out dangerous subversives, and the other side might claim that they 
were defending academic freedom, but both sides understood that they 
were really fighting over university governance. As one Regent declared at 
a board meeting that plotted strategy for dealing with faculty resisters: “It 
is now amatter of demanding obedience to the law of the Regents” (p. 181). 
Blauner’s familiarity with faculty-administration relations enriches 
his narrative throughout. He speculates that UC faculty must have re-
sented taking orders from the Regents because the rich and powerful 
political appointees who ran the university were “not scholars, scientists, 
or intellectuals” (p. 8). Blauner retells an anecdote popular with faculty 
at the time: when the Regents learned that Phi Beta Kappa, the national 
honor society, had condemned the loyalty oath, one Regent replied that 
he was glad such a “fraternity” had never “rushed” him in his college 
days. The other Regents applauded; Phi Beta Kappa apparently did not 
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“rush” any of them, either (p. 267). Nor were the faculty any more in-
clined to take orders from UC President Robert Sproul, who had “no 
formal education beyond his undergraduate years, when he had studied 
business,” as Blauner explains. “Thus many professors viewed him as too 
business-oriented, too much of a ‘Rotarian,’ to understand the academic 
mind” (p. 22). Blauner’s intuitive feel for academic life alerts him even to 
subtleties of timing: he points out that some of the Regents’ most objec-
tionable initiatives were launched at the beginning of summer or winter 
vacations, when professors would be dispersed and hence less capable 
of organizing a concerted response. It is safe to assume that the Regents 
knew this, but Blauner is not fooled any more than the faculty were. 
Endowed with a professor’s sensibility, and with great human sym-
pathy as well, Blauner is able to craft moving personal vignettes about his 
UC predecessors. He chronicles the countless professorial friendships, 
marriages, careers, psyches, collegialities, and stomach linings that were 
wrecked by the strain of this struggle. He connects the far-flung research 
interests of individual faculty members in disparate fields with their joint 
determination to oppose the oath, which requires impressive intellectu-
al breadth and depth on his part. Blauner knows professorial habits and 
mindsets so well that he can remark in passing that “the non-signers had 
forged a solidarity that was unique in an academic culture based on in-
dividualism and competition” (p. 172). Blauner also draws upon his fa-
miliarity with college teaching to focus attention on non-tenure-track 
academic employees caught in the oath controversy, such as lecturers, in-
structors, visiting professors, and teaching assistants. Fives times more of 
these non-tenure track faculty lost their jobs for not signing the oath than 
did regular professors, and yet previous historians of the controversy have 
unjustly neglected their fate. Given that non-tenure-track faculty now do 
most of the teaching at large public universities, Blauner’s attention to their 
predicament in 1950 is more relevant than ever. Women professors were 
also rare in 1950, but Blauner reveals that they, too, were disproportion-
ately victimized: women composed less than two percent of UC faculty but 
almost ten percent of those fired for not signing the loyalty oath. Again, 
given the much greater academic prominence that women have attained 
since 1950, Blauner’s emphasis here is appropriate and long overdue. 
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The villain of this piece, as Blauner presents it, is clearly John Francis 
Neylan. A powerful attorney for the Hearst Corporation with a long ca-
reer in state government, Neylan was the most domineering Regent be-
hind the loyalty oath. “Neylan was willing to employ any trick, no matter 
how duplicitous, to gain his objectives,” writes Blauner (p. 226). Here 
again, Blauner’s sense of academic politics enables him to explain why 
Neylan became such a ruthless enforcer of the oath even though he had 
originally opposed it and seemed to care little about it — until faculty 
resisted it. Only then were Neylan’s hierarchical hackles raised: “Neylan 
made it clear that he believed it was the Regents, and not the faculty, who 
ran the university” (p. 102). Imperious by nature, Neylan was a man ac-
customed to having his way, especially with underlings, and he was not 
about to tolerate faculty insubordination. Neylan comes across here as 
a bully, but Blauner also heaps blame on President Sproul, whose bum-
bling ineptitude was repeatedly demonstrated during the long crisis. It 
started when Sproul tricked the Regents into approving the loyalty oath 
by springing it upon them unannounced at the end of a routine meet-
ing, while spouting assurances that the faculty would not object. When 
the faculty did object, Sproul denied responsibility for the oath and tried 
to blame the Regents instead. Yet when the Regents seemed ready to re-
scind the oath, Sproul convinced them to retain it for credibility’s sake. 
At the same time, Sproul tried to reassure the faculty that he was on their 
side, and that no non-communist professor would ever be dismissed for 
defying the oath — which turned out to be false. Neylan called Sproul 
“a vacillating weakling” (p. 119 and p. 170), but both men’s behavior, in 
different ways, was all too typical of university administrators. A much 
higher standard was set at the time by President Robert Hutchins of the 
University of Chicago, who successfully defied attempts by the Illinois 
legislature to terrorize his faculty with anti-communist witch hunts. 
Hutchins emphatically denounced the red-baiting of academic intellec-
tuals as “the greatest menace to the United States since Hitler” (p. 68). 
Participants in the loyalty oath controversy drew a variety of les-
sons from the ordeal. UC students, through campus newspapers, rallies, 
petitions, and even cash donations, expressed support for non-signers; 
they also expressed disappointment that so many faculty caved in to 
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the oath. The Daily Californian considered the outcome an object lesson 
in “the gap between what professors say and what they do” (Blauner’s 
paraphrase, p. 182). The Daily Bruin called UC professors “timid souls, 
concerned first and foremost with their economic security” (Blauner’s 
paraphrase, p. 228). One faculty member, after signing the oath, told his 
students: “Today I am ashamed to stand before you and I feel apologetic 
that I haven’t been fired” (p. 186). The chilling effect of the loyalty oath 
upon teaching was much noted at the time. Some of the more cautious 
professors decided that it was unsafe to discuss Communism objectively 
in their classrooms any more, lest their loyalty fall into question. They 
were reduced to uttering meek echoes of the dominant anti-communist 
consensus, much to the detriment of UC students, who received an in-
complete education about the Cold War. Ironically, however, any criti-
cism of Communism that UC professors did offer became automatically 
suspect after the oath controversy, because UC students would naturally 
assume that the faculty were compelled to say such things in order to 
keep their jobs. 
An important lesson of the loyalty oath controversy for Clark Kerr, 
then a labor economist at UC Berkeley, was the need to protect faculty 
from administrators. Soon he would have a chance to apply this lesson, 
for in 1958, Kerr was appointed to succeed Robert Sproul as the next 
UC president. President Kerr rehired some ex-UC professors who had 
resigned in protest over the oath, and he prevailed on the Regents to 
bolster tenure guarantees in order to facilitate recruitment and to rebuild 
a ravaged faculty. But Kerr’s focus on faculty left him unappreciative of 
student concerns and over-sensitive to red-baiting from politicians, the 
press, and the community. Kerr was typical of many UC faculty who 
emerged from the loyalty oath controversy “fearful and rule-bound,” ac-
cording to Blauner, leaving them ill-prepared to handle radical student 
movements that would trigger Kerr’s downfall in 1967 (p. 236). Another 
UC faculty member during the loyalty oath controversy who later gained 
prominence was the psychologist Erik Erikson. “The faculty’s mistake,” 
Erikson decided afterwards, “was to wage battle on ideological grounds.” 
Instead, he believed that anti-oath professors “should have been orga-
nized into a group, such as a labor union, and have used their collective 
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power to fight the issue” (p. 133). Blauner agrees: “If there was one lesson 
the faculty learned from the years of the oath,” he writes in his conclu-
sion, “it was the need for organization” (p. 222). Yet to this day, Univer-
sity of California professors, unlike their counterparts in the California 
State University system and in many community colleges, remain unor-
ganized without a faculty union. 
Gardner’s earlier history of the loyalty oath controversy described it 
as “a vain and futile episode,” but Blauner disagrees. “Resisting McCar-
thyism,” his chosen title, was a necessary and solemn obligation for all 
Americans of conscience. Blauner openly admires his faculty forebears 
who made a brave stand on behalf of academic freedom in the face of 
political intimidation. At the same time, however, Blauner recognizes 
that academic freedom, though important to those who resisted the loy-
alty oath, became a side issue in the controversy. His account places the 
struggle over university governance squarely at the center of the story, 
with the faculty and the Regents fighting for power more than princi-
ple. Hence Blauner’s title seems out of place: it makes no more sense to 
claim that the loyalty oath controversy was about “Resisting McCarthy-
ism” and defending academic freedom than it does to claim that it was 
about rooting out communist subversives. This is not the book ’s only 
flaw: Blauner makes a number of small mistakes. He claims that Ani-
ta Whitney, a famous legal client of Neylan’s, was convicted of a 1916 
bombing, when in fact she was convicted of violating the Criminal Syn-
dicalism Act in 1920, unrelated to any bombing; he refers to the eminent 
California historian Kevin Starr as “Kenneth Starr”; he improperly cites 
the case Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.2d 18 (1967), as “Vogel v. 
California” (p. 23, p. 131, p. 219). Blauner also overreaches a bit in tracing 
Berkeley’s reputation as a “center of political resistance” back to this epi-
sode (p. 241). One suspects that the 1960s were more important than the 
1950s in that regard. Still, Blauner’s close attention to the latent issues 
lurking beneath the manifest ones, and his empathy for the professors’ 
plight, make this book easily the best one ever written on California’s 
loyalty oath controversy. ✯ 
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